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In democracies, trade policy is the result of interactions among many agents with different agendas.
In accordance with this observation, we construct a dynamic model of legislative trade policy-making
in the realm of distributive politics. An economy consists of different sectors, each of which is concentrated
in one or more electoral districts. Each district is represented by a legislator in the Congress. Legislative
process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game a la Baron and Ferejohn (1989). Some
surprising results emerge: bargaining can be welfare-worsening for all participants; legislators may
vote for bills that make their constituents worse off; identical industries will receive very different
levels of tariff. The results pose a challenge to empirical work, since equilibrium trade policy is a function
not only of economic fundamentals but also of political variables at the time of congressional negotiations
– some of them random realizations of mixed bargaining strategies.
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“But to introduce a tariﬀ bill into a congress or parliament is like throwing a
banana into a cage of monkeys. No sooner is it proposed to protect one industry
than all the industries that are capable of protection begin to screech and scramble
for it. They are, in fact, forced to do so, for to be left out of the encouraged ring
is necessarily to be discouraged.” — Henry George (1886).
Attempts by economists to understand the process of trade policy formation1 have evolved
from approaches based on electoral competition (Mayer, 1984), through lobbying (Findlay
and Wellisz, 1982) and inﬂuence-peddling (Grossman and Helpman, 1994), to more recent
work focussed on the workings of legislative assemblies (such as Grossman and Helpman,
2005 and Willmann, 2004).
In this paper, we add an important element to the analysis: dynamic, non-cooperative
congressional bargaining. Models that focus on congressional decision making assume a
uniﬁed majority party writes and passes a bill, such as Grossman and Helpman (2005), or
that implicit cooperative congressional bargaining maximizes joint utility of representatives,
as in Willmann (2004). These approaches provide simplicity by clearing away by assumption
many of the features that make trade policy complicated in practice. By contrast, in the
model we propose here, in order to move tariﬀsf r o mt h estatus quo,t h em e m b e ro ft h e
Congress who can set the agenda must propose a trade bill and ﬁnd a majority coalition
willing to support it. In choosing how to vote, each member considers the uncertainty over
who will have agenda-setting power next, and thus over what tariﬀ bill will emerge down
the road if the current bill fails. In this setting, a number of features emerge that are quite
diﬀerent from what other models oﬀer:
1There is an extensive literature on trade policy formation; see Rodrik (1995) and Nelson (1999) for a
review.
1(i) The trade policy that emerges will depend on which member of the Congress has
agenda-setting power, apart from the fundamentals generally accounted for in empirical
work — both economic fundamentals (industry size, elasticities of demand, and so on) and
institutional fundamentals (political organization of the industry). Indeed, since omnibus
trade bills are passed infrequently, this implies that, at any given date, the structure of tariﬀs
across industries can be largely the result of who chaired what committee, for no matter how
brief a period, many years ago.
(ii) The equilibrium of the bargaining game is typically in mixed strategies. Conditional
on fundamentals and the identity of the agenda-setter, the outcome is random because the
agenda setter chooses randomly between industries to attract to the winning coalition. The
randomness of this choice is a deep feature of the model that results from the dynamic nature
o ft h eg a m e—s p e c i ﬁc a l l y ,t h ep o s s i b i l i t yo fm u l t i p l er o u n d so fb a r g a i n i n ga f t e rt h ec u r r e n t
round if no bill passes; a static game would have no reason for randomness. As a result,
even conditional on fundamentals and also on the identity of congressional leadership at the
time of the bill’s passage, empirical work explaining the determinants of tariﬀs might need
to control for the identity of the winning coalition, perhaps proxied by the members who
voted in favor.
(iii) Because of the uncertainty about the future agenda setter and future proposals that
will come to the table, in many cases a member of the Congress will vote for a bill that is
worse for her constituents than the status quo.A g a i n ,t h i si saf e a t u r eo ft h ed y n a m i cn a t u r e
of the model and would disappear in a static version.
The key elements of the model can be seen in the rough and tumble of trade-bill formation
in practice. Consider the 1880’s in the United States, a period in which trade policy was
perhaps the most contentious and vigorously debated issue of the day and the issue on which
at least one national election was decided. Consider three central elements to our story, each
of which requires a dynamic model. (i) Uncertainty about the agenda setter. The main
agenda setter in the US House of Representatives for trade bills is the chair of the Ways and
Means Committee, appointed by the Speaker of the House. In 1883, the Speaker was Samuel
2Randall, a Democrat from Pennsylvania, an ardent protectionist allied with iron and other
industries of his home state. He was challenged in that year for the position of Speaker by
John Carlisle of Kentucky, a Democrat from a rural area committed to much lower tariﬀs
all around. The battle for the chairmanship was intense, and Carlisle surprised everyone
by pulling an upset victory (Tarbell, 1911, p. 137)). Carlisle appointed a moderate free-
trader, William Morrison of Illinois, to the Chairmanship of Ways and Means. Later, the
agenda-setter changed unpredictably once again, when Morrison in 1886 lost his re-election
campaign and was replaced at Ways and Means by a stauncher free trader, Roger Mills of
Texas (Tarbell, 1911, p. 155). The agenda-setter changed more dramatically in 1888, when
Republicans won a majority in the House, and staunch protectionists seized control from the
ardent free traders. Thus, in just a few years, the agenda-setting power changed hands several
times, among politicians with very diﬀerent policy preferences. (ii) The proposed trade bill
changes dramatically with the identity of the agenda setter. Several diﬀerent trade bills were
proposed during this period, and the proposed bills changed character rapidly with changes
in the agenda setter. For example, the Mills bill of 1888 lowered tariﬀsa c r o s st h eb o a r d ,
while the McKinley tariﬀ bill passed by the new Republican house in 1890 raised tariﬀs
sharply for almost every industry (Tarbell, 1911, pp. 188-206). (iii) The coalition supporting
a proposed bill does not depend merely on party, but on the contents of the bill. Randall,
for example, had built a coalition of supporters for his protectionist agenda that included a
wide range of Republicans and a number of Democrats willing to buck their party’s dominant
free-trade ideology (Tarbell, 1911, p. 137). (iv) Members of the Congress vote strategically,
sometimes voting for a proposal that will make things worse for their constituents, because
they are concerned that the next proposal might be even worse. This can be seen in the
decision by Randall’s supporters in the House to support the Mills tariﬀ reduction bill ‘with
heavy hearts’ as likely the best they could obtain, although it reduced tariﬀs rather than
raised them as their constituents desired (Tarbell, 1911, pp. 164-165).
Thus, the main elements of our model are very much in play in the real world of con-
gressional tariﬀ-setting. Now, to sketch our model in more detail. We consider a small
3open economy that accommodates four industries, one that produces numeraire homoge-
neous good using labor alone and three non-numeraire manufacturing industries that employ
sector-speciﬁc capital alone. There are  electoral districts (constituencies),2 each of which
hosts one manufacturing industry along with the numeraire good industry. Individuals who
r e s i d ei nt h es a m ed i s t r i c ta r ei d e n t i c a la n de a c ho n ei se n d o w e dw i t ho n eu n i to fl a b o r
and one unit of capital to be used in the manufacturing industry located in that district.
As a result, there is a potential conﬂict among districts based on (manufacturing) industry
attachment.3
Each district is represented by a legislator in the legislature (Congress).4 Each legislator
cares only about the welfare of her own district,5 and the welfare of a district is closely
related to the industry located in it. In our model, trade policy implies any tariﬀ or subsidy
levied on any sector’s output.6 This setup is consistent with distributive politics since an
increase in the price of a particular good (say, due to protection) will be beneﬁcial only to
those districts that produce it, but will be costly to the whole economy due to its negative
eﬀect on consumption.
We analyze the legislative game as a sequential model of multilateral bargaining with
as i m p l em a j o r i t yr u l eàl aBaron and Ferejohn (1989). This approach to congressional
bargaining has borne much fruit in the political economy of public ﬁnance (see, among
others, Baron, 1993; Primo, 2006 and Battaglini and Coate, 2007), but to our knowledge it
has not yet been used to analyze trade policy. Each period, a proposer is selected randomly
2Constituencies are usually described in geographic terms in studies of the Congress; see Anderson and
Baldwin (1987), Irwin and Kroszner (1999) and Lindsay (1990). This is intuitive since the electorate for
members of Congress is deﬁned geographically.
3Magee (1978), in his study of testimony on trade legislation, ﬁnds strong evidence for sector-based
political activity. Moreover, in other studies, capital and labor are found to be relatively immobile over
politically plausible time horizons; see Nelson (2007), footnote 4.
4We do not model the election of legislators in this paper. However, the results would not change as long
as there is no commitment to party loyalty.
5This is in line with the empirical literature; see, among others, Baldwin (1976; 1985), Hiscox (2002),
Fordam and McKeown (2003) and Ladewig (2006). The underlying assumption is that each legislator must
calculate how voters in her district will respond to a particular trade policy in order to maximize her
probability of re-election.
6Here, we use tariﬀs as a measure of protection. In reality, non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) are also used and
very closely related to tariﬀs as documented by Ray (1981) and Marvel and Ray (1983).
4among risk-neutral legislators to propose a trade policy.7 To pass a bill, the proposer must
create a coalition of supporting legislators large enough to form a majority, in which case
the program goes into eﬀect and the legislature adjourns. Otherwise, the status quo trade
policy prevails and the process is repeated with a new legislator (possibly the same as in the
previous period). In her voting, a legislator compares the beneﬁts accruing to her district
from the current proposal to the value of continuing to the next stage.
A new trade policy aﬀects individuals’ welfare through three distinct channels. First, all
individuals earn capital rent through the sector-speciﬁc capital they own. A higher tariﬀ for
a particular good, therefore, beneﬁts those individuals who have a stake in that industry.
Second, individuals derive utility from consumption. Thus, a higher tariﬀ on any good lowers
their consumer surplus. Finally, individuals share the revenue (positive or negative) from all
taxes and subsidies imposed through trade policy. Keeping these three eﬀects in mind will
be helpful in interpreting the results.
A closer look at our ﬁndings yields the following observations. First, the ex ante expected
beneﬁt an industry receives from congressional bargaining is aﬀected by the industry’s dis-
persion (i.e., the number of electoral districts an industry operates in).8 To focus on the
pure dispersion eﬀect, consider the thought experiment in which each industry produces the
same output, but they diﬀer in the number of districts in which they operate. We show ﬁrst
that, independent of other factors, trade protection is higher for industry  than industry 
if industry  representatives constitute a majority in the Congress. This makes sense; if an
industry is dispersed enough to have a majority representation in the Congress, then it will
receive more protection due to its agenda-setting power.9
7Random recognition is a convenient way to model the uncertainty that legislators face, i.e., they do not
know exactly which coalitions will form in the future if the current coalition fails to enact the legislation.
Although the purely random selection is of course an abstraction, the uncertainty regarding the agenda
setter is important in practice, as illustrated by the historical example discussed above, and this convenient
abstraction is used in an enormous literature following Baron and Ferejohn (1989).
8Busch and Reinhardt (1999) argue that geographical concentration is diﬀerent from political concen-
tration. Our focus is on industry spread across political districts, hence more in line with the deﬁnition of
political concentration. However, for simplicity, we do not distinguish between these two terms.
9We do not have political parties in our model, so the only way an industry can hold sway over a majority
of districts is to have voters with an economic stake in that industry residing in a majority of districts. If we
had parties in the model, it could also be possible for an industry to gain inﬂuence by being concentrated in
5However, we show that if no industry has a majority in the Congress, more disperse
industries have no advantage ex ante over less disperse industries. The reason is that a more
disperse industry has a better chance of holding agenda-setting power (since it controls more
seats), and so it can drive a harder bargain when it is in a coalition. Consequently, when
it is not the agenda setter, it has a much lower probability of being included in a coalition.
This is a subtlety that as far as we know has not been investigated in empirical work.
Second, in case no industry has majority representation in the Congress, the ex ante
expected beneﬁt an industry receives from Congressional bargaining is determined by that
industry’s total output. In particular, larger industries that produce more output tend to
beneﬁt less from congressional negotiations over tariﬀs than smaller industries. The reason
is that such an industry will generate fewer imports (since it will satisfy more of domestic
demand from domestic production), and so the tariﬀ revenue produced by a given tariﬀ will
be small; but this means that if a large industry is a member of the coalition that forms the
tariﬀ bill, the coalition partner will receive little beneﬁt from a tariﬀ on the large industry,
and so will be unwilling to agree to a high tariﬀ.
Third, in addition to these factors, the status quo tariﬀsa l s om a t t e r . 10 In particular, if
the initial protection for an industry is already high compared to other industries, then there
is less room for that industry to improve over its status quo welfare since it is closer to its
ideal protection level than others.
Our model is closely related to Willmann (2004), McLaren and Karabay (2004) and
Grossman and Helpman (2005). In Willmann’s (2004) citizen-candidate model, heteroge-
neous districts behave strategically such that they have a tendency to choose candidates
that are more protectionist than the district median. From a regional perspective, voters
prefer a positive tariﬀ, ignoring the tariﬀ costs imposed on other districts. In contrast, from
districts held by the majority party, even if the industry is geographically concentrated. Evidence for this is
provided by Fredriksson, Matschke and Minier (2011), who show, using U.S. tariﬀ data from 1993, that an
industry receives positive protection if it is relatively concentrated in districts held by the majority party.
An extension to allowing for parties could be of interest, but is beyond the scope of the present paper.
10The status quo tariﬀs matter for welfare eﬀects even though in the limiting case where the members of
Congress are very patient, they do not matter for the ﬁnal level of tariﬀs. The eﬀect of historical patterns
of protection on current protection is documented by Lavergne (1983) and Ray and Marvel (1984).
6a national perspective, these tariﬀ costs are internalized and, therefore, each district’s rep-
resentative has to make a compromise. Knowing this compromise, in each district, voters
in the ﬁrst stage (namely, regional election stage) choose someone who is more protectionist
than the median voter of that district.
McLaren and Karabay (2004) extend the standard median-voter framework to a rudimen-
tary model of a government by assembly where parties compete by making binding election
promises. In their model, the equilibrium tariﬀ turns out to be the optimal tariﬀ of the
median voter in the median congressional district. They show that import-competing inter-
ests are more likely to receive protection if they are moderately geographically concentrated
(neither too concentrated nor too dispersed). They also conclude that majoritarian systems
tend to be more protectionist than presidential systems.
Grossman and Helpman (2005) consider a three-stage game. First, parties announce their
policy platforms, then elections take place, and in the ﬁnal stage, a particular trade policy
is adopted. In this model, the lack of full commitment to announced party policies creates
protectionist bias as long as districts diﬀer in their capital endowments.
Willmann (2004) models the trade policy determination as a joint welfare maximization
of all legislators whereas Grossman and Helpman (2005) model it as a joint welfare max-
imization of majority party legislators. On the other hand, McLaren and Karabay (2004)
employ an election framework in which trade policy is predetermined. The common property
of all of these papers is that there is not much scope for legislative procedures. In contrast,
non-cooperative legislative bargaining is the core force behind trade policy formation in our
model.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic
model. In section 3, equilibrium is characterized. We discuss possible extensions in section
4. Section 5 concludes the analysis. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
72M o d e l
Consider a small open economy populated with a unit measure of individuals living in 
districts (where  > 3 and divisible by 3). There are  =4industries: one that supplies
a homogeneous numeraire good (good 0) produced with labor alone, and three others, each
of which supplies a homogenous manufacturing good (goods 1 through 3) produced with
sector-speciﬁc capital alone.11 In particular, we assume that the production technology for
good 0 yields 1 unit of output per unit of labor input, and the technology for each non-
numeraire good takes the following form: ()=,w h e r e and  denote the amount
of the sector-speciﬁc capital used in sector  and the economy-wide productivity parameter,
respectively.
Each district is composed of a homogeneous population; each individual residing in a
given district is endowed with one unit of labor and also one unit of the same type of sector-
speciﬁc capital.12, 13 Let the number of districts producing good 0 be denoted by 
such that 1 + 2 + 3 = . Without loss of generality, we assume that 1 ≥ 2 ≥ 3.
Districts that produce the same manufacturing good are populated by the same number of
individuals. To save on notation, we let  denote both the total amount of type- capital in
at y p e -  district and the total number of individuals residing in a type- district. Given that
the population is of unit mass,
3 P
=1
 =1 .14 Let  denote the amount of good  produced
in a district that hosts industry ,a n d denote the total amount of good  produced in the
economy. Therefore, we have  =  and  = .15 In addition, let ∗
 and  represent,
11We limit the number of non-numeraire manufacturing industries to three for simplicity, as in Grossman
and Helpman (2005). Results remain qualitatively similar for 4. There are, however, many more
possibilities (of coalition formation) to consider. See section 4 for further remarks.
12Our results carry over even if more than one industry is allowed in each district as long as each resident
still holds only one sector-speciﬁc capital and in every district there is one industry with majority repre-
sentation. This is true since each legislator will follow the interests of the median voter, who belongs to a
particular industry under the conditions assumed here.
13We do not model the location choice of a particular industry, rather we take it as given. However, we
acknowledge that this choice may depend on the political inﬂuence they can exert in each location.
14We allow only those districts that produce diﬀerent goods to diﬀer in the number of citizens residing.
This is done to simplify the notation. Alternatively, it is possible to allow each district (even the ones
producing the same good) to be populated by diﬀerent number of individuals. All of our results continue to
hold.
15To make things simple and analytically tractable, aggregate output of each industry is perfectly inelastic
8respectively, the exogenous world price of good  and its domestic price. On the other hand,
the numeraire good, good 0, has a world and domestic price equal to 1 (see footnote 18).
Thus, the total rent that accrues to capital in district  is  = , and the total labor
income earned in district  is .
Each individual has an identical additively separable utility function given by:
 = 0 +
3 X
=1
 (),( 1 )
where 0 is the consumption of good 0 and  represents the consumption of good  =
123. We assume that  ()= − (2
2),w h e r e  0 a n da s s u m e dt ob es u ﬃciently
large.16 With these preferences, the domestic demand for good 0, implicitly deﬁned by
0
 (()) = ,i sg i v e nb y()= − . The linearity of demand is not crucial for the
main results of our paper, but it simpliﬁes the analysis and permits a closed-form solution.
The indirect utility of an individual with income  is  + (p),w h e r ep =( 1 2 3) is the
vector of domestic prices, and (p)=
P3
=1 [ (()) − ()] is the resulting consumer
surplus.
Each district is represented by a single legislator who is concerned only with the welfare
of her own district. A district’s welfare is the aggregate utility of all individuals in that
district, which is equal to the total income plus the district’s share in total consumer surplus
and total tariﬀ revenue (or subsidy cost) for each good. Hence, a district that produces good
 h a saw e l f a r e( f o r 6=  6= ):











)( −  − )],( 2 )
where the ﬁrst term is the district’s labor income (equal to one unit of good 0 output per
person), the second term is the capital rent, the third term is the consumer surplus captured
in our setup. This is merely to eliminate some complexity, but there is some evidence that supply elasticities
tend to be quite low in practice; see Marquez (1990) and Gagnon (2003).
16To be more precise, we require   ∗
 +  − . This ensures that demand for good  is positive at all
prices that may occur in legislative bargaining. We also require ∗
 >  for each price to be positive. See
section 3 for the determination of optimal prices.
9by that district, and the last term is the share of tariﬀ revenue (or subsidy cost).17 In
addition, we denote (p) as the welfare of an individual with a stake in industry , hence
(p)=(p).
We consider an inﬁnite-horizon model. Every period, there is a set of prices at which in-
dividuals make their production and consumption decisions, and enjoy the resulting welfare.
The legislature can change the prevailing status quo, p =( 
1 
2 
3), by changing the do-
mestic price of any good via legislative bargaining. We restrict the set of policy instruments
available to the legislature and allow only for trade taxes and subsidies. A domestic price in
excess of the world price implies an import tariﬀ f o ra ni m p o r tg o o da n da ne x p o r ts u b s i d y
for an export good. Domestic prices below world prices correspond to import subsidies and
export taxes.18
The timing of the trade-policy formation game in our model is based on the Baron-
Ferejohn bargaining framework. This is a game of complete information. At the start
of each period (before any production or consumption takes place), a legislator is selected
randomly to propose a vector of domestic prices for all manufacturing goods produced,19 with
equal probability for each legislator. Therefore, the probability that the proposer represents
industry  is equal to

. We restrict each domestic price to be non-negative and below
some ﬁnite upper bound.20 If the proposal receives a simple majority, it is immediately
implemented and the legislature adjourns. Each district’s welfare thereafter is evaluated at
the new prices.21 If the proposal does not receive a majority, the process is repeated with
17We assume that tariﬀ revenue (or subsidy cost) is distributed equally as a lump-sum transfer to each
individual.
18Without loss of generality, we assume that the tariﬀ/subsidy on good 0 is equal to 0.A n yt a r i ﬀ vector
0 yielding domestic prices 0∗ + 0 with 0
0 6=0can be replaced by 00 ≡ 0 −
0
0
00 without changing relative
prices or any real values. Given that good 0 is the numeraire, this implies that ∗
0 = 0 =1 .
19To simplify, we assume that a period in the legislative game coincides with a production/consumption
period.




2(−) . These limits ensure that we get an interior solution in prices.
21Note that once a proposal is accepted, the game ends so that there will be no future proposals. The
underlying assumption is that the legislative bargaining process is too costly to be repeated. Indeed, it is
possible to show that if a new proposal is allowed in every period even after an agreement is reached, then
the expected welfare of each industry is lower. See the discussion section for more on this issue.
10another legislator randomly selected to propose a program. Bargaining continues until a
program is implemented.22 Districts continue to receive their status quo welfare in every
period until an agreement is reached.
There are a couple of things to note. First, it is straightforward to show that the aggregate
welfare, (p)=
P3
=1 (p), is maximized at the free trade prices of the three goods.
Hence, if the prices were set by a central authority (such as a President), free trade would
prevail forever. In the current paper, however, we are interested in policy-making by a
legislature. This naturally introduces a conﬂict of interest among legislators since each
legislator is selﬁshly interested in maximizing her own district’s welfare. Put another way,
when proposing a program, each legislator weighs the marginal beneﬁts and costs for her
own district but ignores the negative externality imposed on others. Therefore, the resulting
trade policy is ineﬃcient for the economy as a whole.
Second, from (2), a manufacturing good aﬀects (through its price) a district’s welfare via
three channels. The ﬁrst one, the rent that accrues to the speciﬁcf a c t o r ,i sp r e s e n ti ft h a t
good is produced in that district. The second one is the consumer surplus attained from the
consumption of that good. The last one is the tariﬀ r e v e n u e( o rs u b s i d yc o s t )d u et ot r a d e .
The eﬀect of price through the ﬁrst channel is always positive whereas it is always negative
through the second channel. Its eﬀect through the third channel, on the other hand, can be
positive or negative (in fact the third channel is concave in all three prices). This is true since
good ’s price has two distinct eﬀects on tariﬀ revenue/subsidy cost: (1) the direct eﬀect
(changing price while keeping imports/exports constant), and (2) the indirect eﬀect through
demand. These two eﬀects work in opposite directions. To see this, assume that good  is
an imported good. First, start from a price just above the world price. As we increase the
price, the direct eﬀect leads to an increase in the tariﬀ revenue whereas the indirect eﬀect
leads to a decrease (since import demand goes down). Initially, the direct eﬀect dominates,
22We model the legislative process as an inﬁnite horizon game. According to Osborne and Rubinstein
(1994), “a model with an inﬁnite horizon is appropriate if after each period players believe that the game
will continue for an additional period, while a model with a ﬁnite horizon is appropriate if the players
clearly perceive a well-deﬁned ﬁnal period.” In our setup, there is uncertainty about the exact time when
the legislative period will end. Therefore, there is no well-deﬁned ﬁnal period in our game.
11and therefore, raising the price raises tariﬀ revenue. When the price reaches a certain value,
the indirect eﬀect starts dominating and the tariﬀ revenue decreases if we further increase
the price.
3 Characterization of equilibrium
In this section, we investigate the properties of the bargaining outcome. As common in
multi-person bargaining problems, there may be many subgame perfect equilibria (SPE)
in this game.23 We focus on stationary subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) whereby the
continuation payoﬀs for each structurally equivalent subgame are the same.24 In a stationary
equilibrium, a legislator who is recognized to make a proposal in any two diﬀerent sessions
behaves the same way in both sessions (in the case of a mixed-strategy equilibrium, this
generally means choosing the same probability distribution over oﬀers). Hence, stationary
e q u i l i b r i aa r eh i s t o r y - i n d e p e n d e n t .T om a k eo u rr e s u l t sa sc l e a ra sp o s s i b l e ,w ef o c u so nt h e
case in which the discount factor (denoted by ) approaches 1 in the limit.25
Let the per-period equilibrium welfare of a district producing good , evaluated at the
beginning of a period, before the proposer has been selected, be denoted as .T h i s i s
also the per-period equilibrium welfare a district expects in the event that the period ends
without a bill passed, and so we will also call it the ‘continuation payoﬀ.’ (Recall that
we are focussed on the limiting case as  → 1.) When faced with a proposal, a legislator
votes yes only if the welfare her district gets in the current proposal is not less than its
continuation welfare.26 Since a random proposer is selected every period, the outcome of
legislative bargaining depends on the identity of the proposer. In this sense, the outcome is
23Baron and Ferejohn (1989) show that any outcome (in their game that means any division of the dollar)
can be supported as an SPE using inﬁnitely nested punishment strategies as long as there are at least ﬁve
players and the discount factor is suﬃciently high. Li (2009) shows that even with three players, there is a
vast multiplicity of SPE.
24Baron and Kalai (1993) argue that stationarity is an attractive restriction since it is the “simplest”
equilibrium such that it requires the fewest computations by agents.
25This corresponds to the case in which the time length between any two oﬀers (sessions) is inﬁnitesimally
short. See section 4 for the implications of relaxing this assumption.
26We assume that a legislator who is indiﬀerent between accepting a proposal and continuing to the next
session accepts the proposal. Therefore, weakly dominated strategies are ruled out.
12ex ante uncertain. We use the expected per-person welfare change due to bargaining as the
basis for comparison among individuals with stakes in diﬀerent sectors. To this purpose, let
 denote the equilibrium continuation welfare of an individual with a stake in industry ,
thus  = .
T h ew e l f a r eo fad i s t r i c tp r o d u c i n gg o o d, given in (2), can conveniently be decomposed
into two parts: the welfare evaluated at the status quo prices, and the change in welfare due
to legislative bargaining. Let τ =( 123),w h e r e =  − ∗
. If good  is an imported
good and   ∗
 (  ∗
), then  describes import tariﬀ (subsidy). If, on the other hand,
good  is an exported good and   ∗
 (  ∗
), then  describes export subsidy (tax).
Similarly, let τ =( 
1
2
3) describe the vector of status quo trade taxes (or subsidies).
Noting that  = −
 +
,t h ew e l f a r eo fad i s t r i c tt h a tp r o d u c e sg o o d, given in (2), can
be rewritten on a per capita basis as






























































where the ﬁrst bracket is the welfare evaluated at the status quo prices. Rearranging the



















This decomposition is helpful as it allows us to express the per capita welfare change in
each district as a function of each industry’s trade tax and total output. The ﬁrst term in the
parentheses indicates the per-capita change in capital rent while the second term indicates
the per-capita change in consumer surplus plus tariﬀ revenue.
The ﬁrst-best for each legislator is to maximize her district’s welfare without any con-
straints. Note that maximizing aggregate district welfare (τ) is equivalent to maximizing







denote the vector of trade taxes that the unconstrained maximization problem leads to, i.e.,
τ =a r g m a x
 (τ). Maximizing (3) with respect to ,  and  yields the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Unconstrained maximization of (τ),  =1 23, yields (for  6=  6= )









Thus, a recognized (selected) legislator would ideally demand an import tariﬀ (or an
export subsidy) for the good her district produces (thereby protecting industry )w h e r e a s
an import subsidy (or an export tax) for the other goods. Moreover, a producer in a sector
that produces higher aggregate output  will prefer a lower tariﬀ (or export subsidy) for
her own product than a producer in a sector that produces lower aggregate output. The
reason is as follows. Focus for now on the case of an imported good. Recall the three
channels discussed before through which the tariﬀ aﬀects the per capita welfare of producers
in industry . Aggregate output, ,i nt h i sc a s ed o e sn o ta ﬀect the ﬁrst two channels (the
rent and consumer surplus channels — of course, a higher  implies higher total rent, but
not higher rent per capital owner in industry ). What it does aﬀect is the third channel,
tariﬀ revenue. A higher value for  implies a weaker tariﬀ revenue eﬀect since, at a given
price and the other parameters, a higher value of  implies fewer imports, hence a lower
marginal tariﬀ revenue for a given increase in tariﬀ.27 Therefore, a higher value of  implies
al o w e rm a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁto ft h et a r i ﬀ,a n dal o w e ro p t i m a lt a r i ﬀ, from the point of view of a
sector- producer. Parallel reasoning holds for an exported good.
27The same conclusion holds for a comparison between two industries  and  even if, although   ,
the demand parameter  is suﬃciently higher than  that at a common tariﬀ, imports of good  exceed
those of good . The reason is that an increase in , holding all prices and other parameters constant,
raises industry  imports, increasing the marginal tariﬀ revenue from the tariﬀ on good , but at the same
time raises domestic consumption of good , raising the marginal consumer surplus loss from the tariﬀ on
good .T h et w oe ﬀects cancel each other out, with the result that the demand parameters  have no eﬀect
on tariﬀ preferences.
14It is natural to assume that the status quo prices are in the range deﬁned by the un-
constrained maximization problem. For example, a legislator representing a district that
produces good  has no reason to set  above  − . Similarly, she has no reason to set
6= below −. Hence, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1. The status quo prices satisfy the following: − ≤ 
 = 
 − ∗
 ≤  − ,
for  =1 23.
Hence, a value of 
 =  −  corresponds to the case in which the status-quo tariﬀ of
good  is at its optimum for the districts that produce good , while 
 = − corresponds to
the case in which it is at its optimum for the districts that produce good  6= . Accordingly,








=(  − −−).
As mentioned earlier, a proposal will be accepted when majority support is obtained in
the Congress. As a result, there are two possible cases to be considered. We ﬁrst analyze the
situation when one of the manufacturing goods is suﬃciently dispersed across the country




W en e x tt u r na t t e n t i o nt oam o r ee v e nd i s t r i b u t i o no fi n d u s t r i e si nw h i c hn om a n u f a c t u r i n g
good has a majority representation in the Congress.





This is the case in which one of the manufacturing goods has a majority representation in the
Congress. The solution here is rather trivial; since we focus on the case in which all players
are very patient ( → 1), legislators of districts producing good 1 would refuse any oﬀer
until they receive their ﬁrst-best payoﬀs. In other words, districts that produce good 1 have
the ultimate power in setting the prices of all three goods. When a legislator representing a
district producing good 2 or good 3 is selected as the proposer, depending on the status quo
welfare her district enjoys, she may choose to make a proposal that would be rejected by the




2, the unique SSPE is described as follows.28 When a legislator
representing a district that produces good 1 is selected to make a proposal, she proposes τ =
τ1, and it is accepted immediately. When a legislator representing a district that produces
good  =2 3 is selected to make a proposal, she proposes τ = τ1 if (τ) ≤ (τ1);
otherwise she makes a proposal that would be rejected by the legislature.29 The equilibrium
continuation payoﬀsa r e = (τ1).30
Here, industry 1 is suﬃciently large (i.e., it has the necessary number of seats in the legis-
lature) to set trade policy independently. As a result, the problem becomes an unconstrained
maximization problem. By (3), the expected per-person welfare change can be expressed as

























>From (4), it is clear that for a given value of ,  − (p) is increasing in 
6= and,
given Assumption 1, decreasing in 
. For an individual who has a stake in industry ,al o w
value of 
 corresponds to the case in which the status quo tariﬀ for good  is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent than its optimum value, and hence, there is room for welfare improvement. As 

increases, the potential welfare gain via the change in the price of good  gradually diminishes
and reaches zero when 
 =  − . This is the case in which the status quo tariﬀ for good
 is already at its optimum for industry  agents. A parallel argument can be made for 
6=.
For an individual who has a stake in industry ,ah i g hv a l u eo f
6= means that there is a
big room for welfare improvement by lowering the price of good .A s
6= goes down, the
28Note that under this case, the unique SSPE is also the unique SPE.
29Note that for each status quo price vector, there is a critical value of  below which an agreement is
always reached in the ﬁrst period independent of the identity of the proposer. In contrast, the accepted price
vector in this case depends on the identity of the proposer.
30These are the continuation payoﬀs in case of an agreement. Since an agreement can be reached only
when the proposed prices are 1, it follows that  = (τ1).
16potential improvement via the change in the price of good  becomes lower and reaches zero
when 
6= = −. Again, this is the case when the status quo tariﬀ for good  is already at
its optimum for industry  agents.
Furthermore,  − (p) is increasing in 6= and decreasing in . As stated before,
aggregate output of each industry aﬀects individual welfare via the third channel, namely
the tariﬀ revenue eﬀect. We know from Lemma 1 that each individual prefers a price above
the world price for the good in which she has a direct stake and a price below the world
price for the other goods. Consider imported goods for the moment. This implies that each
individual receives a tariﬀ revenue for its own industry’s good and incurs a subsidy cost for
other goods. A higher value of  (6=) implies fewer imports, hence a lower tariﬀ revenue
(subsidy cost). A similar reasoning holds for exported goods.
Moreover, in light of the assumed range for the status quo tariﬀs, it is possible to rank the
welfare change from the best to worst across individuals with stakes in diﬀerent industries.
Note that, for a given 
2 and 
3, 1−1(τ) attains its minimum at 
1 = −1.E v a l u a t e d






2 > 0,s ot h e r ei sa l w a y saw e l f a r eg a i nf o r
individuals who have a stake in industry 1.31 On the other hand, for individuals associated
with industries 2 and 3, whether there is a welfare gain or loss depends on the values of

, ∀.G i v e n t h a t − ≤ 
 ≤  − , it is easy to see that the maximum value of
[2 − 2(τ)+3 − 3(τ)] i sz e r o ,i m p l y i n gt h a ta tl e a s to n eo ft h et w om u s tb en e g a t i v e
(except for when (
1
2
3)=( −1−2−3) or (−1−2−3), in which case
both of them are zero). Moreover, if 
2 + 2  
3 + 3,t h e n2 − 2(τ)  3 − 3(τ)
(and vice versa). However, per-capita welfare gain accruing to industry 1 is at least as much
as any possible welfare gain accruing to other industries. This is due to the agenda-setting
power of the legislators representing industry 1.
In short, in Case 1, the majority industry sets a positive tariﬀ for itself and a negative
tariﬀ for all other industries, and does so without any strategic constraint since it needs
no coalition partners or consent. Now we consider the more interesting case in which no
31When 
1 =  − 1, 
2 = −2 and 
3 = −3,t h estatus quo tariﬀs coincide with the optimal tariﬀs;
i.e., τ = τ1. In this case, the welfare change will be zero.
17manufacturing industry can control the majority of seats in the legislature, so a legislator
who can propose a trade bill needs the support of the legislators representing at least one
other industry. To get their votes, she has to oﬀer them a more favorable tariﬀ compared
to the unconstrained case, which moves the ﬁnal outcome away from her ﬁrst-best. This is
what we analyze next.





Here, we analyze the bargaining outcome when no industry is highly dispersed throughout
the economy. In this case, unlike in Case 1, a recognized legislator may not be able to achieve
the ﬁrst-best outcome for her district since she has to compromise with at least one other
industry in order to attain simple majority of the votes. We refer to this situation as the
proposer selecting a ‘coalition partner’ (or simply ‘forming a coalition’).
When a legislator is recognized to make a proposal, she has an incentive to propose a pro-
gram that will be accepted, since if rejected, she faces the risk that her district will be worse
oﬀ in the program adopted in the future. In equilibrium, in accordance with the “Riker’s
(1962) size principle,” any proposal will be accepted with the minimal number of industries
that constitute a quorum of districts. This is true since increasing the number of industries
in the coalition would increase the costs without increasing the beneﬁts. Hence, the recog-
nized legislator will make a proposal that will be accepted by not only the representatives
of the districts producing the same manufacturing good but also the representatives of the
districts producing one other good. In order to get the acceptance of the latter, the proposal
should provide their districts an ex post welfare not less than their discounted continuation
payoﬀs.
Suppose a legislator representing a district which produces good  is recognized to make a
proposal. If she chooses to reward the districts which produce good  6= , her maximization










18The left-hand side of the inequality indicates the discounted total welfare at the proposed
prices, whereas the right-hand side is what a legislator representing a district that produces
good  expects in case she does not vote in favor of the proposal (individuals in her district
obtain their status quo welfare for the current period and the expected continuation welfare
thereafter).32 The recognized legislator will choose τ such that the constraint is satisﬁed
with equality. Thus, the constraint can be rewritten as:
(τ)=( 1− )(τ
)+.
As in Baron and Ferejohn (1989), in Case 2, in an SSPE with  close to 1, generically
there is an equilibrium in which the proposer randomizes between the two other industries
in choosing a coalition partner. The proof is in the appendix, but the crux of the idea can be
summarized as follows. In an SSPE, by deﬁnition, if proposer  ever chooses industry  with
probability 1, then (due to stationarity) she always will choose industry  with probability
1. But this means that industry  has enormous bargaining power, and consequently at any
given date, it will be less attractive for  to choose  than the other industry — a contradiction.
Let  denote the probability that  will choose , and hold constant the behavior of the other
players when they are proposers. A reduction in  lowers ’s continuation value, hence
bargaining power, and raises ’s ( 6=  6= ). Therefore, a critical value of  exists at which 
is indiﬀerent between the two potential coalition partners, and this is the equilibrium value.
The proper proof must take into account boundary conditions as well as the fact that each
player’s probability over partners is endogenous, and it turns out that when all three players’
probabilities are determined together, the equilibrium choice of probabilities is not unique,
although the payoﬀs are. In the proof of Proposition 2, we ﬁrst show that when  → 1 an
SSPE exists in which all legislators randomize between the other two industries. We then
p r o v et h a ta l lS P P Ea r ep a y o ﬀ equivalent. We now present the main result.
Proposition 2 When 1
 ≤ 1
2,i nt h el i m i ta s → 1 an SSPE exists in which a selected
legislator representing a district which produces good  proposes a tariﬀ  = 2
3− for the
32Note that districts that accommodate the same industry are identical, so if this inequality holds for one,
then it also holds for all.
19good her district produces, a tariﬀ  = 1
3− for good  6=  where  is selected randomly,
and a tariﬀ  = − for the remaining good .T h e ﬁrst proposal receives a majority












2 for the industry the proposer represents,
 = (τs)+[(










2 for the industry the coalition partner










2 for the remaining industry that
is outside the coalition.
Note also that since  → 1, ex ante expected per capita payoﬀs for any industry  before
the proposer is determined are the same as the ex post payoﬀs that industry would obtain if
it was chosen ex post as the coalition partner, which is given by  = (τs)+[(











2 for  ∈ {123}.
Compared to Case 1, since the proposer needs the approval of one other industry, she
compromises by proposing a lower price for her own industry and a higher price for the
industry selected as the coalition partner. Below, we summarize the important properties of
this SSPE.
1. For given values of , 
 and , ∀ ∈ {123}, the continuation payoﬀ of any district
(or expected welfare change of any individual) is in between the highest and the lowest
continuation payoﬀs obtained under Case 1. This makes sense since no industry is
dispersed enough to control the legislature single-handedly. Therefore, no industry is
either very strong or very weak. Thus, compared to Case 1, districts producing goods
2 and 3 have signiﬁcantly higher bargaining power, which, in turn, reduces the welfare
gain (may even result in welfare loss) districts that produce good 1 expect.
2. Per capita expected welfare change of each individual with a stake in industry  is
increasing in 
6= and 6= and decreasing in 
 and  as in Case 1 for exactly the
same reasons stated before. Moreover, depending on the values of 
,t h eex ante
expected welfare change can be positive or negative for each industry, and it can be
20positive for all of them or negative for all of them.33 In contrast, in Case 1, industry
1 always observes a welfare gain, and, independent of τ, there is always one industry
(must be either industry 2 or 3) which experiences a welfare loss.
3. The ranking of ex ante welfare gains for individuals with stakes in diﬀerent industries
depends only on the values of 
 and , ∀ ∈ {123} and are independent of indus-
try dispersion (as long as

 ≤ 1
2 for all ). This last point may be surprising: an
industry that dominates twice as many congressional districts as another receives no
net advantage from that fact (as long as it does not have a majority) — even though
it will thereby have twice the probability that one of its representatives will be the
proposer. The reason comes from the dynamic nature of the bargaining. If industry
 has a large minority of the seats and thus a high probability of being the proposer,
it will gain from a high tariﬀ if it is the proposer; and in any round where  is not
the proposer, the probability that it will become so in the next round is high. But
the other representatives will understand that industry  will therefore drive a tough
bargain if another industry is the proposer and chooses  as a coalition partner, so  will
rarely be chosen as a coalition partner. Industry ’s beneﬁt from being the proposer
with high probability is exactly cancelled out by its loss from being excluded from the
coalition with high probability when it is not the proposer.34
We should note that in the mixed strategy equilibria, randomization probabilities are
not unique although they all lead to the same set of payoﬀs, as stated in the following
proposition.35
33For instance, when (
1
2
3)=(  − 1− 2− 3),  − (τ)=5
9





3 − 1 
3 − 2 
3 − 3),  − (τ)=−1
9
2  0 for all .
34This can be seen formally from the proof in the Appendix. Equation (A.2) shows how an industry’s ex
ante expected beneﬁt can be written in terms of probabilities of being the proposer (

 ) and the probability








in addition to parameters. The remainder of the proof shows
that these probability terms cancel out, implying that any increase in

 and corresponding decrease in 

or 
 results in adjustment of  and  (the probability that  is picked by  or ) so that the probability
of being a coalition partner falls by 1 =2t i m e sa sm u c ha st h ei n c r e a s ei n

 .
35The same multiplicity is also present in the standard symmetric Baron-Ferejohn game, see Celik and
Karabay (2011). Eraslan (2002) shows that all SSPE in the Baron-Ferejohn game are payoﬀ equivalent when
the recognition probabilities are asymmetric.
21Proposition 3 All SSPE are payoﬀ-equivalent.
More broadly, Proposition 2 provides a number of characteristics for the equilibrium
that are strikingly diﬀerent from characteristics of models without dynamic bargaining and
that may be useful in empirical work or in interpreting tariﬀ history. First, note that the
equilibrium tariﬀs are a function of economic fundamentals such as industry size ,b u t
they are also a function of political variables at the time of the congressional negotiation.
Note that after controlling for industry size, the tariﬀ i sh i g h e s tf o rt h ei n d u s t r yr e p r e s e n t e d
by the proposer and lowest for the excluded industry. The identity of the proposer is most
plausibly determined by the party with the majority in the Congress at the time of the tariﬀ
bill together with internal party competition for the leadership post; years later, even with
diﬀerent leadership, the tariﬀ structure will be determined partly by the political conditions
a tt h et i m eo ft h et a r i ﬀ bill. Even conditional on the identity of the proposer, the tariﬀ
structure is aﬀected very much by the identity of the coalition partner, which receives a tariﬀ
premium, and this choice is necessarily randomized due to the mixed equilibrium required by
the dynamic logic of the model. In empirical work, one might imagine a number of proxies
for the ‘proposer,’ including, in the US case, the chairmanship of the House Ways and Means
Committee or the Senate Finance committee; and one might think of using an ‘aye’ vote on
the most recent tariﬀ bill as a proxy for the theoretical construct of the ‘coalition.’ Both
should have a signiﬁcant correlation with tariﬀs.
Another way of looking at this is that the logic of congressional bargaining imposes dif-
ferent levels of protection for diﬀerent industries even if all industries are ex ante identical.






3.T h e n m o s t
other models would predict 1 = 2 = 3. Grossman and Helpman (2005) would predict the
same tariﬀ for each industry within the same party. However, in our model, there would be
three separate levels of tariﬀ,w h i c hw o u l db ec o r r e l a t e dw i t ht h el e g i s l a t o r s ’v o t e s ,a n dn o t
correlated with party aﬃliation once the votes have been controlled for. Thus, the empirical
predictions of this model are quite diﬀerent from those of other models.
Second, note that often representatives in the Congress in this model will vote for a
22bill that they do not like, because with the dynamic bargaining, they are afraid that if the
current bill does not pass, it will be replaced with something that they like even less. This
can be seen clearly by examining point 2 above. It is easy to ﬁnd parameters such that
the ex ante welfare change resulting from the bargaining is negative for each industry. For
example, suppose that the status quo is free trade in a symmetric economy, so that 
 =0
and  = 
3, ∀ ∈ {123}.I nt h i sc a s e ,t h eex ante expected welfare change for each industry
is negative (as can be seen from the equation immediately after Proposition 2), since each
industry knows that total welfare will fall as tariﬀsa r ei n t r o d u c e db yt h eb a r g a i n i n g ,b u t
no-one knows who the ex post beneﬁciary will be. Consequently, the ex post welfare change
for the coalition partner as a result of the bargaining will be negative. This implies that the
coalition partner will vote for a tariﬀ bill that lowers its utility relative to the status quo (in
this case, a tariﬀ bill that gives no tariﬀ at all to its own products, while providing a positive
tariﬀ to the proposer and a negative one to the excluded industry). This is because it fears
the possibility of being the excluded industry in the next round. It will support the bill as
some members of the Congress from manufacturing districts supported the tariﬀ-reducing
Mills bill of 1888: “with heavy hearts” (Tarbell, 1911, p. 165).
Indeed, it is easy to ﬁnd cases in which the proposer proposes and votes for a bill that
lowers its utility relative to the status quo,b e c a u s ei ti sa w a r et h a ti tm i g h tn o tb et h e
proposer in the next round and may face something worse. As an example, suppose that
the status quo tariﬀs are close to the unconstrained optimum tariﬀs τ for industry  from
Lemma 1. In this case, industry  k n o w st h a ti fi ti sn o tt h ep r o p o s e r ,t h o s et a r i ﬀsw i l lb e
changed and it will lose utility, so it will cut its losses and ﬁnd a tariﬀ bill that its coalition
partner will agree to now. This is in the same spirit as when protectionist Republicans,
following a rousing speech in which President Cleveland made the case for free trade and the
political momentum was moving in that direction, struggled to come up with a strategy for
reducing tariﬀsi naw a yt h a tw o u l db l u n tt h a tm o m e n t u m :“ P r o t e c t i o nm u s tb ep r e s e r v e d .
If its operations were to be corrected, this must be done by its friends, not its enemies.”
(Tarbell, 1911, p. 154.)
234D i s c u s s i o n
In this section, we discuss four points related to possible extensions of our model. The
ﬁrst one regards the number of industries. We have, for simplicity, considered only three
(manufacturing) industries. It is possible to generalize this to a larger number of industries.
The main intuition still holds. If one industry has majority representation, then that industry
gains the most. On the other hand, if none of the industries has a majority, then it is the
total production and status quo tariﬀ/subsidy that determine the gains for each industry. For
example, consider four industries with the following distribution: 1
 =0 4, 2
 =0 3, 3
 =
025, 4
 =0 05. In this example, industry 4 is too small to be valuable as a partner in any
coalition. However, when welfare changes from bargaining are considered, it is still possible
for industry 4 to beneﬁtm o r et h a no t h e r sa sl o n ga s
4+4 is small enough and 
 +’s for
 =1 23 are large enough. Moreover, assuming symmetric dispersion of industries, as the
number of industries increase, the ex post tariﬀs (as well as the ex ante tariﬀs) decrease.36
The second point is about the bargaining procedure. We have assumed that once an
agreement is reached, bargaining ends. Instead, assume that legislators bargain every period
and that if an agreement is reached in the previous period, it constitutes the status quo for
the current period. In the context of a divide-the-dollar game, Kalandrakis (2004) shows
that there is a Markov equilibrium in which, irrespective of the initial status quo payoﬀs,
whoever is the proposer is eventually able to achieve her ﬁrst-best (i.e., take the whole
dollar). The intuition is as follows. In every period, players reach an agreement in which
36Assume that there are  symmetrically dispersed industries such that 1
 =  = 
 .T o o b t a i n
majority, the support of the −1
2 industries are required besides the industry the proposer belongs. Then,
















We can easily see that as  increases, the ex post tariﬀs obtained by the proposer and the coalition partners
decrease. The ex ante tariﬀs decrease as well since they are equal to what coalition partners get adjusted
for the total industry output (i.e., the second term in the coalition partner’s tariﬀ).
24there is at least one player who receives nothing. Since this constitutes the status quo for the
following period, the proposer in the next period selects the player with zero payoﬀ as the
coalition partner, and is thus able to take the whole dollar for herself. The same logic is also
at work in our model. In every period, one industry, say industry , will be left out of the
winning coalition, getting a tariﬀ  = −, and having the lowest status quo payoﬀ in the
following period. Thus, if a legislator representing industry  6=  becomes the proposer in the
following period, she chooses industry  as her coalition partner, and is able to appropriate
higher gains. After some time in the game, whoever is the proposer (say industry )w i l l
propose τ (unconstrained maximization tariﬀs) and it will be accepted. This result is true
irrespective of the discount factor and the status quo prices. However, although an industry
is able to achieve its ﬁrst-best when its representative becomes the proposer, it receives the
w o r s tp o s s i b l ep a y o ﬀ in the remaining scenarios. On average, it actually does worse relative
to when bargaining ends once an agreement is reached.37 Hence, if we add an initial stage
to our model where players can decide whether to play the game once or continuously, they
will choose to play once. When
1
  1
2, on the other hand, legislators will agree on τ after
a few periods. In this case, the expected payoﬀs remain the same as in our model.
The third point is about the discount factor. For analytical convenience, we have con-
sidered the limiting case in which  approaches 1. In the context of a Baron-Ferejohn
divide-the-dollar game with asymmetric recognition probabilities (as in our paper), Eraslan
(2002) shows that an SSPE with fully mixed strategies does not exist when  is below a
certain threshold. This is also true in our game. When 1, depending on the values of
37Once the game converges to a stationary stage in which the proposer is able to achieve its ﬁrst-best,















































3 + 3), one or more industries may use pure strategies





with the highest 




3+3 = +, the industry with the highest

 may
never be chosen as a coalition partner if  lies below a threshold.38 However, in both cases
our qualitative results would remain true. In particular, the ranking of welfare gains remains
the same; i.e., the industry with the lowest 
 +  does the best while the one with the
highest 
 + does the worst. When 
1 +1 = 
2 +2 = 
3 +3 =  +, all industries
are equally well oﬀ unless one industry is suﬃciently dispersed and  is suﬃciently low so
that it is never chosen as a coalition partner. In this case, that industry does better than
others (namely, the beneﬁt of being the proposer with high probability outweighs the loss
from being excluded from the coalition). If the expected welfare gains are positive (negative),
then they would decrease (increase) with a lower , eventually converging to zero as  goes
to zero.
The ﬁnal point is about the productivity parameter. Again, for analytical convenience,
we have assumed that all industries have the same productivity. Once we assume diﬀerent
productivity for each industry, the model is not analytically tractable. Therefore, we solve
the model numerically. In this case, there are too many moving parts in the model and it is
hard to control all of them. To simplify matters, we assume that total industry output is the
same for each sector. Let us deﬁne a vector Θ =( 1 2 3).W es t a r tf r o mΘ =( 1 11) and
then increase the productivity of industry 1 by increasing 1 while keeping 2, 3 and total
output (hence import penetration) constant. In this case, the ex post tariﬀ levels depend
on the identity of the proposer. However, we can say that among all the industries that
are proposers, the higher productivity sector obtains the highest ex post tariﬀ.T h e s a m e
result also holds among all the partner industries. On the other hand, the ex ante expected












, for any value of  ∈ (01)
there is always randomization as long as 0 ≤  ≤ 1
2, ∀. On the other hand, if  +  is outside of the
interval deﬁned above, there will be randomization as long as each  ∈ [],w h e r e  0 and 1
2 are
endogenously determined as a function of ( + , , ).
26tariﬀ level is smaller for the higher productivity industry, since as productivity of industry 
increases, the probability that industry  i si n c l u d e di na n yc o a l i t i o ng o e sd o w ni no r d e rt o
prevent industry ’s continuation payoﬀ to increase further. In fact, it is easy to construct
examples in which the ex ante welfare change for the more productive industry is the worst.
The only study we are aware of that focusses on the eﬀect of productivity on protection is
Karacaovali (2011), who shows that in Colombian data more productive industries ceteris
paribus r e c e i v em o r ep r o t e c t i o n . I tw o u l db eo fi n t e r e s tt ot a k eo u rﬁndings to that sort
of data. One possibility would be to look at the interaction between industry productivity
and membership in the legislative coalition (which could be proxied with legislative voting
history). Membership in a legislative coalition has a positive eﬀect on an industry’s tariﬀ in
our model, but the eﬀect is larger if its productivity is higher.
5C o n c l u s i o n
We have developed a model of legislative trade policy-making in a setting of distributive
politics. A small open economy has many districts, each one of which is associated with a
particular industry. Thus, there is a conﬂict among districts hinged on industry attachment.
Trade policy is determined collectively in the legislature as a result of bargaining among
legislators, each of whom seeks to serve the interests of the district she represents. The
legislative process is modeled as a multilateral sequential bargaining game àl aBaron and
Ferejohn (1989).
Our analysis has three characteristics that are distinct from existing studies; (1) In addi-
tion to the usual factors accounted for in empirical work, the resulting trade policy depends
on the identity of the agenda setter; (2) The congressional bargaining generally has an equi-
librium in mixed strategies due to its dynamic nature; and (3) Because of the uncertainty
about the future, strategic voting can lead a legislator to vote for a proposal that will make
her district worse oﬀ compared to the status quo.
In short, our model is dynamic and considers a parliamentary setting that stresses the im-
portance of institutional structure on trade-policy formation. Furthermore, it is rich enough
27to encompass the ﬁndings of the existing literature as well as to incorporate new elements
to them by analyzing the eﬀects of dynamic, non-cooperative congressional bargaining.
In our model, we have considered the legislature as an ultimate decision-making body
without any outside interference. One might alternatively consider an executive with veto
power, such as a President. In such a situation, even though the President does not have
a decision-making authority, she can veto some proposals that are not in agreement with
her own agenda. For example, in the United States, legislators come from plurality elections
in small districts whereas the President is elected in national elections. The diﬀerence in
constituents of legislatures and the Presidency could plausibly aﬀect the preferences and
goals that each brings to congressional bargaining. This extension is outside the scope of
this paper, however.39
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2. When a legislator representing industry  is selected as the







 ) where, 

 is the tariﬀ industry  gets, 

 is the tariﬀ industry  gets and


 is the tariﬀ industry  6=  gets.
Now, suppose a legislator representing industry  is selected as the proposer and she





















 ) > (1 − )(τ
)+.
Maximizing per capita welfare (τ) is equivalent to maximizing (τ) − (τ).F u r -
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 ) − ),
where 
 is the Lagrange multiplier when a legislator representing industry  is selected as
the proposer and she chooses industry  6=  as the coalition partner. It represents the cost
to the proposing legislator of obtaining the additional votes needed to pass the proposal.

















We ﬁrst show that, in an SSPE in which all proposers employ mixed strategies in choosing
their coalition partners, the value of 
 is independent of the identity of the proposer and of
the coalition partner, i.e., 
 =  for all  6= ,  =1 23. This follows from the following
two observations. First, a legislator would employ a mixed strategy in choosing a coalition
partner only when the ex post payoﬀ her district enjoys is the same under each alternative.
In other words, when a legislator representing industry  is selected as the proposer, she























































 ) and (
 
 









































It is easy to see that this is possible only if 
 = 
. Second, when industry  is chosen
as a coalition partner, the ex post w e l f a r ei ti so ﬀered would be independent of the identity
of the proposer, because whoever is the proposer always oﬀers an ex post welfare of  to








































































































Again, this is possible only if 
 = 




, which implies that 
 =  for all  6= ,  =1 23.N e x t ,w eﬁnd the equilibrium value
of  in an SSPE in which all proposers employ mixed strategies in choosing their coalition
partners. We ﬁrst write down the equilibrium ex post per capita welfare in three distinct
cases.




















































































We next express the equilibrium continuation welfare of a district on a per capita basis.
To do so, we need to introduce randomization probabilities. Let  denote the probability
that a legislator representing a district that produces good  chooses the districts producing





















 +( 1− )

 ].( A . 1 )






































.( A . 2 )
Next, observe that the maximization problem implies 

 =  (since the constraint
















































=( 12 + 13)
1

+( 21 + 23)
2














































































So, the value of  can be determined without the knowledge of the randomization prob-
















The ﬁnal step of the proof is to show that there is an interior solution to all of the
randomization probabilities (this is what we assumed at the beginning of the proof). Since
the continuation per-period, per-capita welfare is equal to ex post welfare when chosen as a
coalition partner (by the maximization problem), i.e.,  = 































































32Note that these equations are linearly dependent (two of them imply the third), so we




2,t h e r ei sa n



























yields 1 2 ∈ [01].
It is important to note that an industry may select its coalition partner with pure strategy.
However, there are limitations. Feasible solutions (i.e., the solutions that satisfy  ∈ [01]


































3. In this case,
1 = 2 = 3 in all SSPE, so (1 2 3)=( 1 11) and (1 2 3)=( 0 00) are both
possible. Similarly, when 1
 = 1







is the unique SSPE in this case. Other than these two special
cases, only industry 2 or industry 3 may select its coalition partner with pure strategy.
Finally, the continuation per-period welfare of a district on a per capita basis can be






















































33P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 .We will prove payoﬀ uniqueness by showing that the randomiza-
tion strategies that are not already accounted for in the proof of Proposition 2 cannot arise
in an SSPE. Possible scenarios include all three industries or only two industries using pure
strategies. We will eliminate all possibilities step by step. When only one industry uses pure
strategy, the proof of Proposition 2 is perfectly applicable, so possible SSPE involve industry
2 choosing industry 3 with pure strategy, or vice versa. All other possibilities can be ruled
out because they lead to non-interior solutions (i.e.,  6∈ [01] for some ).
Before proceeding with the proof, we would like make an important observation that will

































is strictly decreasing in  for all 0. This means that if 
 
, then we must have
 =0because, otherwise, industry  can proﬁtably deviate by mimicking industry  and
selecting industry  as a partner rather than industry .
Observation 1. The following conﬁguration cannot arise in an SSPE:  =  =1for
 6=  6= .
This is the case when one industry is selected as a coalition member with pure strategy
by each one of the other two industries. Intuitively, this puts industry  in a veto-player
position which enables it to achieve its ﬁrst-best. This, in turn, leads to a proﬁtable deviation
by each one of the other two industries. To see this, we follow the same steps as in the proof
of Proposition 2. Under the strategies  =  =1 , both industry  and  give industry 




For industry  to randomize between the other two industries according to  ∈ [01],i t






 =  and 
 = 
 = . Then, for industries  and  not to deviate from
 =  =1 ,w em u s th a v e ≤ . The equilibrium ex post welfare of industry  as the

































































































This leads, by the constraint 









































































This is possible only when  =1 . Together with the earlier condition that  ≤ ,t h i s







































































































where the last line uses the fact that  =1 . By the constraint 















































 , the following conﬁguration cannot arise in an
SSPE:  =  =  =1for  6=  6= .
Under this conﬁguration, each industry is selected as a coalition member by one of the
other two industries. As in the proof of Observation 1, for each industry to play according













































































































By the constraint 































































Observation 3. The following conﬁguration cannot arise in an SSPE:  =  =1
and  ∈ (01) for  6=  6= .
Under this conﬁguration, industry  is selected as a coalition member less often than the
others, which lowers its equilibrium continuation payoﬀ. This, in turn, induces industry  to
choose industry  with pure strategy. Note that we have assumed  ∈ (01) since  =0
can be ruled out by Observation 1 while  =1can be ruled out by Observation 2.





















































































































By the constraint 










































from the ﬁrst of the above equations. Plugging this expression


































2, the following conﬁguration cannot arise in an SSPE:
 =  =1and  ∈ (01) for  6=  6= .
Under this conﬁguration, industry  is never selected as a coalition member, which lowers
its equilibrium continuation payoﬀ. This, in turn, leads to a deviation by the other two
industries. Note that we have assumed  ∈ (01) since both  =0and  =1can be
ruled out by Observation 1.




















































































By the constraints 

 =  for  =  (note that 

 =  cannot be used here




























































But then, industry  (same applies for industry , too) can deviate by selecting industry 

















































































































 .A l s o n o t e t h a t(1+2)2
(1+)2 is increasing
in  for 1. Hence, both industry  and  beneﬁt. This is a contradiction to the initial
conﬁguration.
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